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A B S T R A C T
This study examines the eﬀect of experience and knowledge on weather insurance adoption. First, we conduct
insurance games with farmers, and ﬁnd that the treatment improves real insurance take-up by 46%. The eﬀect is
not driven by changes in risk attitudes and perceived probability of disasters, or by learning of insurance
beneﬁts, but is driven by the experience acquired in the game. Second, we ﬁnd that providing information about
the payout probability has a strong positive eﬀect on insurance take-up. Finally, when subjects receive both
treatments, the probability information has a greater impact on take-up than does the disaster experience.
1. Introduction
Financial development plays an important role in economic
growth. However, the diﬀusion of new ﬁnancial services is usually
slow.1 One example of a new ﬁnancial product with a particularly
low spontaneous take-up rate is weather insurance. Despite its
importance in shielding farmers from weather-related risks and in
inﬂuencing their production investment (Cole et al., 2013a, 2013b;
Karlan et al., 2014a, 2014b; Cai, 2015), the take-up rate of weather
insurance products is extremely low even with heavy government
subsidies. Existing research has explored a number of possible
explanations for this low take-up rate, including a lack of trust, a
lack of ﬁnancial literacy, or credit constraints (Giné et al., 2008;
Gaurav et al., 2011; Cole et al., 2013a, 2013b; Cai et al., 2015).
However, insurance demand remains low even after some of these
barriers are removed in an experimental setting. In this paper, we
use a novel randomized experimental design to study two less well-
explored factors that may impact insurance adoption: one is
personal experience with disaster, and the other is knowledge of
the payout probability.
First, experience with natural disasters may inﬂuence individual
insurance purchase decisions. However, the relative infrequency of
large natural disasters means that individuals do not experience the
beneﬁts of insurance until a disaster happens. Moreover, people who
have diﬀerent disaster experiences may also be diﬀerent in other
aspects, such as education, life expectancy, etc. To address these
challenges in investigating the role of experience on insurance adoption
decisions, we use insurance games to simulate hypothetical experience
with disasters. Using this approach, we are able to exploit the
exogenous individual-level variation in hypothetical experience to
disentangle the eﬀects of hypothetical experience from other poten-
tially confounding eﬀects, including changes in people's risk attitudes,
perceived probability of future disasters, and perception of insurance
beneﬁts.
Second, many ﬁnancial products have low take-up because people
are uncertain about the expected returns, as typically only ex-post
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outcomes are observed. In this paper, taking advantage of a key feature
of weather insurance products - payouts are determined by exogenous
weather shocks, we provide the ﬁrst study to show how oﬀering
information regarding the true expected returns of a ﬁnancial product
aﬀects adoption decisions.
To study the role of disaster experience and knowledge on
individual insurance take-up decisions, we designed a randomized
experiment based on the introduction of a new weather insurance
policy for rice farmers oﬀered by the People's Insurance Company of
China (PICC), China's largest insurance provider. The experiment
includes two interventions. In the ﬁrst intervention, we test how
hypothetical experience aﬀects insurance demand. Speciﬁcally, we
provide participants with hypothetical experience regarding weather
shocks and insurance beneﬁts by playing an insurance game. During
the game, we ﬁrst ask a household head whether he/she would like to
buy rice insurance in a hypothetical future year. We then play a lottery
to determine if the participant experiences a weather-related disaster in
that year. After the lottery, we help participants calculate their
hypothetical income for the year based on their insurance decision.
We play the game with each participant for 10 rounds to establish a
base of hypothetical experience of weather shocks and insurance.
Next, one or three days after the game intervention, we visit each
participant and ask whether he/she would like to purchase weather
insurance. The results show that participating in the game increases the
actual insurance take-up by 9.1 percentage points, a 46% increase
relative to the baseline take-up rate of 20 percentage points. This eﬀect
is roughly equivalent to experiencing a 45% greater loss in yield in the
past year, or a 45% increase in the perceived probability of future
disasters.
Examining the mechanisms that drive this increase in insurance
adoption, we ﬁnd that the main mechanism is the hypothetical
experience itself. We arrive at this conclusion by ﬁrst examining
subjects' post-game risk attitudes and perceptions of disaster prob-
ability. The results indicate that neither attitude nor perception
changes by an amount which could generate the observed 9.1
percentage point increase in insurance take-up after the game.
We next examine whether learning about insurance beneﬁts is
responsible for the observed eﬀect. To test this mechanism, we
estimate the impact of a pure insurance education treatment on take-
up, and we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect. Moreover, we show that the game
treatment does not aﬀect households’ insurance knowledge signiﬁ-
cantly.
Lastly, we test whether the game eﬀect is driven by the hypothetical
experience with disasters. To do so, we explore the exogenous variation
in the number of hypothetical disasters experienced during the game.
The results show that the total number of disasters signiﬁcantly
increases the take-up rate, with the number of disasters in last few
rounds exhibiting the strongest eﬀect. Speciﬁcally, experiencing one
additional hypothetical disaster in the last ﬁve rounds increases
insurance take-up by 7 percentage points. This suggests that hypothe-
tical experience with disasters might be the main mechanism driving
the game eﬀect.
We further explore why experiences in the latter part of the game
have a larger impact on real insurance take-up. There are three likely
explanations. First, participant memory may decrease over time,
leading them to be more likely to remember more recent experiences.
Second, recent hypothetical experience makes disasters more salient to
farmers. Third, subjects may fail to iterate and believe that only the last
rounds of game caused the overall game outcomes. We rule out the
decline in memory as the reason because of the short time frame of the
experiment. Moreover, we show that a greater number of hypothetical
disasters in latter rounds of the game also increases the perceived
probability of disasters. We thus conclude that the recency eﬀect is
more likely due to a salience eﬀect or failure of iteration rather than
decreasing memory over time.
In the second main intervention of the experiment, we test whether
improving knowledge about the product value aﬀects insurance
demand by revealing the real probability of disaster to a randomly-
selected set of farmers in our experiment. Doing so, we ﬁnd a large
positive eﬀect of the probability treatment on insurance adoption:
farmers who are informed about the real disaster probability are almost
30 percentage points more likely to buy the insurance.
Interestingly, for the set of farmers who receive both knowledge and
experience, we ﬁnd that knowledge of disaster probability has a greater
impact on insurance adoption, especially when the disaster probability
indicated by the game is higher than the true probability. This ﬁnding
also provides insight into how ﬁnancial education can be better
designed to increase product adoption.2 Speciﬁcally, our study shows
that information on the true expected values of ﬁnancial assets could be
important in improving the eﬀectiveness of ﬁnancial education.
Finally, we examine the impact of our intervention on household
welfare. To explore this question, we calibrate insurance take-up using
a benchmark model and the parameters elicited from our surveys (See
Appendix B for details). Our results show that the calibrated insurance
take-up rate is 58.6% at the post-subsidy price (3.6 RMB) and 47.3% at
the full price (12 RMB). Speciﬁcally, the game treatment increases the
take-up rate from about 20 to 30%. Thus, we conclude that our
interventions are likely to help individuals make better decisions,
although the take-up rate obtained after our intervention is still far
from the benchmark level. However, we should note that our inter-
vention increases insurance take-up regardless of the quality or price of
the insurance product; thus, whether our intervention is welfare-
improving depends on the context.
This paper relates to the existing literature in several ways. First,
this paper sheds light on the slow diﬀusion of new technologies and
ﬁnancial products in emerging markets. We show that playing insur-
ance games with farmers simulates hypothetical experience of disasters
and increases the real insurance take-up. The large impact of the game
treatment and the insigniﬁcant eﬀect of the calculation treatment
suggest that, giving households a rule of thumb to follow through
simulated experiences could be more eﬀective in improving their
decision-making compared with oﬀering theoretical training.3 This
insight can be used on a broader level to inﬂuence the adoption of other
products and activities that (1) involve uncertainty and (2) require
some time to experience the gain or loss. Moreover, the observed large
eﬀect of revealing the true probability of disasters on insurance
adoption shows that helping people understand the true expected
value of the insurance product has an impact on their subsequent
choices. Many other ﬁnancial decisions also involve complexities that
individuals have diﬃculty understanding based on their own informa-
tion. Our ﬁndings suggest that providing information on the true
expected values of ﬁnancial assets in ﬁnancial education programs
could be important in improving individual decision-making.
Second, our results also relates to the literature on the eﬀect of
personal experience on individual decision-making. Although existing
studies have shown the eﬀect of experience on consumption and
ﬁnancial decisions (Gallagher, 2014; Haselhuhn et al., 2009;
Malmendier and Nagel, 2011; Kaustia and Knüpfer, 2008), the impact
of simulated experience on household behavior has been largely
unexplored with one notable exception: (Gaurav et al., 2011) study
the impact of ﬁnancial education obtained via an insurance game on
real insurance take-up in India. The key diﬀerence between our study
and (Gaurav et al., 2011) is that we exploit the exogenous individual-
level variation in hypothetical experience to disentangle the eﬀects of
2 The literature suggests mixed results on the eﬀectiveness of ﬁnancial education in
increasing product adoption (Duﬂo and Saez, 2003; Bayer et al., 2009; Carlin and
Robinson, 2012; Gaurav et al., 2011; Cole et al., 2013a, 2013b; Drexler et al., 2014; Cai
et al., 2015).
3 This result is consistent with Drexler et al. (2014), which shows that rule-of-thumb
training is more eﬀective than standard accounting training in improving micro-
entrepreneurs' ﬁnancial decision making.
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hypothetical experience from other potentially confounding eﬀects.
Third, this paper contributes to the literature on recency eﬀects by
exploring the mechanism behind such eﬀects. Within this body of
literature, several lab and ﬁeld experiments (Fredrickson and
Kahneman, 1993; Schreiber and Kahneman, 2000; Haisley and
Loewenstein, 2011; Erev and Haruvy, 2013; Healy and Lenz, 2014;
Karlan et al., 2014a, 2014b) show that recent experiences play a
stronger role in inﬂuencing subsequent behaviors. Our study contri-
butes to this research by showing that the number of disasters in last
few rounds of the game has a stronger eﬀect on both insurance take-up
and the perceived probability of disasters than the number in earlier
rounds. We conclude from this ﬁnding, as well as the brief nature of our
game, that the recency eﬀect is due to a salience eﬀect or failure of
iteration rather than reductions in participant memory.
Lastly, from the perspective of methodology, we demonstrate that
laboratory experiments can serve as interventional mechanisms in
obtaining ﬁeld results. We do so by testing the causal eﬀect of the
laboratory experiment itself on actual behavior in the ﬁeld. This design
diﬀers from the more commonly used design of having all subjects
participate in both a laboratory experiment and a ﬁeld intervention,
and correlating behaviors across the two (Ashraf et al., 2006; Gazzale
et al., 2011; Fehr and Goette, 2007; Benz and Meier, 2008).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
provide background information on rice insurance in China. In Section
3, we describe the experimental design. In Section 4, we explain the
main empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2. Background
Nearly 50% of farmers in China produce rice, which represents the
staple crop for more than 60% of the Chinese population. In 2009, The
People's Insurance Company of China designed the ﬁrst rice insurance
program in China and oﬀered it to rural households in 31 pilot
counties.
We conduct the experiment in 16 natural villages within two of the
rice production counties included in the government's ﬁrst round pilot
of the insurance program. Our sample counties are located in Jiangxi
province, which is one of China's major rice bowls. All households in
these villages were oﬀered with the formal rice insurance product.
The insurance contract is as follows. The full insurance premium is
12 RMB per mu per season.4 Since the government subsidizes 70% of
the premium, households need to pay 3.6 RMB. If a farmer decides to
buy the insurance, the premium is deducted from the rice production
subsidy deposited annually in each farmer's bank account, with no cash
payment needed.5 The policy stipulates that the policyholder is eligible
to receive a payment if he/she experiences a 30% or greater yield loss
due to any of the following reasons: heavy rain, ﬂoods, windstorms,
extremely high or low temperatures, or drought. The loss rate in yield is
determined through an investigation by a group of insurance agents
and agricultural experts. The payout amount increases linearly with the
loss rate in yield. The maximum insurance payout is 200 RMB, which
covers at most 25% of the rice production income.
To illustrate this policy, let's consider the following example.
Suppose the production income is 1000 RMB per mu. The farmer
can buy the insurance with 3.6 RMB/mu. If a wind disaster reduces
this year's yield by 40%, the farmer will receive 200*40%=80 RMB per
mu from the insurance company. Based on the estimation from the
local weather station, the true probability of disaster is about 10%. To
make the take-up decision, a risk neutral farmer compares the expected
payoﬀ of not buying insurance (0.9*1000+0.1*600=960) and that of
buying insurance (0.9*(1000 − 3.6) + 0.1*(600 − 3.6 + 80) = 964.4).
Thus, a risk neutral subject who believes that the disaster risk is 10%
or higher should buy the insurance.
The insurance product considered here diﬀers from index-based
weather insurance oﬀered in other countries in several aspects. The
product is actually a great deal for farmers, as the post-subsidy price is
only around 1% of the production cost. Moreover, this product is more
vulnerable to moral hazard as the payout is determined by loss in yield.
However, the moral hazard problem should not be large here as the
maximum payout (200 RMB) is much lower than the proﬁt (800 RMB),
and the product does require natural disasters to happen in order to
trigger payouts.
3. Experimental design
The experiment was conducted in the Summer of 2009 and the
Spring of 2010 with a total of 885 households in Jiangxi province of
China. The timeline for our experiment is presented in Fig. 1. The
experiment consists of two rounds of interviews for each household,
with either one or three days between the two rounds. In round 1, the
experimenters provide each household with a ﬂyer detailing the
information about the insurance contract. We then administer the
baseline survey. After that, we randomly assign each household to one
of four interventions, explained below. At the end of round 1, house-
holds are asked to think about whether they would like to buy the rice
insurance, and are told that we will return in a few days to ask them
what their purchase decision is. Then either one or three days later, we
conduct a round 2 visit in which we ask farmers to indicate their
purchase decisions and to sign the contract if they decided to buy the
insurance.
The experimental design is illustrated in Fig. 2. The experiment has
a 4 by 2 design. The ﬁrst level of randomization consists of four groups
that diﬀer in how the insurance contract is explained to farmers. The
second level of randomization consists of two groups that diﬀer in
whether we explicitly inform them about the true disaster probability.6
To be consistent with the insurance policy design, “disaster” is deﬁned
as natural disasters including heavy rain, ﬂoods, windstorms, extre-
mely high or low temperatures, or drought that can cause at least 30%
yield loss.
As mentioned, we randomly assign sample households into one of




Control:  do nothing Calculation: calculate 
the benefit of insurance
Game: play the 
insurance games
Measures of risk attitude
Perceived probability of future disaster
Information treatment
Actual take-up decision
1-3 days in between
Round 2
Fig. 1. Timeline of the experiment.
4 1RMB=0.15 USD; 1mu=0.165acre. Farmers produce two or three seasons of rice
each year. The annual gross income per capita in the study region is around 5000RMB.
5 Starting in 2004, the Chinese government has given production subsidies to rice
farmers in order to increase production incentives.
6 Before the randomization, we ﬁrst approached the leaders of the villages and
obtained a list that included the names and basic information about villagers. In our
sample, we exclude households that do not grow rice. We also stratify the sample
according to natural village, age of head of household, and total area of rice production.
In each stratum, households are randomly assigned to one of the eight described
interventions.
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game 20%-disaster-probability group, and the game 10%-disaster-
probability group. These interventions diﬀer in how the insurance
program is explained to the participants. We use two diﬀerent disaster
probabilities in the game treatment so that we can study insurance
adoption behavior when the probability is either similar to or greater
than the real disaster probability of 10%. The detailed procedure for
each group is as follows.
In the control group, the experimenters give each household a ﬂyer
with information about the rice insurance program and brieﬂy explain
the insurance contract. The household head is then asked to ﬁll out a
short survey regarding age, education, experience with insurance,
experience with weather-related disasters, rice production, risk atti-
tudes and perceptions of the probability of future weather disasters.
In the calculation group, the experimenters follow the same
procedure as for the control group, but also demonstrate how to
calculate the expected payoﬀ of buying/not buying insurance in the
case of zero, one, two or three disasters occurring at any time in the
next ten years. The details of the calculation examples provided to
participants are illustrated in Table A1. In addition to demonstrating
the calculations, the experimenters provide the following statement to
each participant: “According to our calculations, if there is no large
disaster in the next 10 years, it is better to not buy insurance in the
following 10 years. If there is at least 1 disaster, it is better to always
buy insurance in the following 10 years.”
In the game 20% (respectively, 10%) group, the experimenters
follow the same procedure as for the control group before conducting
the insurance game with the participant. The game includes ten
rounds, representing the years 2011–2020, respectively, with the same
procedure repeated in each round. Note that one diﬀerence between
our study and most laboratory experiments is that our game is not
incentivized; we pay all households in our study a ﬂat fee to eliminate
any confounding eﬀects due to income eﬀects. Compared with the
calculation treatment, the game treatment explains the calculation of
the expected payoﬀ and also lets farmers explicitly experience hypothe-
tical disasters. While the true probability of disaster is 10%, we conduct
a 20% game treatment as well to increase the variation in hypothetical
experience during the game, and to study the interaction eﬀect of the
game and the probability treatment.
The following illustrates the structure of the game. The household
head is ﬁrst asked whether he or she would like to purchase insurance
in the year 2011. After indicating this decision, the participant then
plays a lottery which reveals whether a disaster occurs in that year. In
the lottery, the participant is ﬁrst shown a deck of ten cards face up to
see how many cards contain a disaster. The participant then draws a
card from the face down deck. After the lottery result is revealed, the
experimenter and the participant calculate the income from that year
based on the assumed expected income per acre plus any insurance
payment (as shown in Table A2). The game is then played for another
nine rounds.7 At the end of the game, the participant receives the same
statement as the calculation group.8
In a crossed randomization procedure, we randomize whether
households are informed of the actual probability of a disaster at the
end of round 1. The objective of providing this randomization is to help
us test whether informing farmers about the true probability of disaster
reduces uncertainty about the value of insurance and consequently
increases the rate of insurance take-up. Interacting this randomization
with how the contract is explained yields eight groups in total.
To study whether the intervention eﬀects are due to changes in risk
attitudes or perceptions of future disaster probabilities, we obtain
information on these variables in round 1. For participants assigned to
the game groups, we obtain this information after participants have
played the insurance game, while for the calculation group, we obtain
this information before the intervention. We elicit risk attitudes by
asking participants to make a hypothetical choice between a sure
amount of a monetary oﬀer (riskless option A) and a risky gamble
(risky option B). We use the number of riskless choices as a measure of
risk aversion. The perceived probability of future disasters is elicited by
asking participants the following question: “what do you think is the
probability of a disaster that leads to a more than 30 percent yield loss
next year?” To indicate their answers, participants are given 10 small
paper balls and asked to distribute these paper balls across two areas:
(1) no disaster resulting in yield loss of more than 30% for the next year
and (2) a disaster resulting in yield loss of more than 30% for the next
year. If a household puts 2 paper balls into (2) and 8 paper balls into
(1), his perceived probability of future disaster is around 20%.
To test whether the game treatment eﬀects are due to changes in
knowledge about insurance beneﬁts, we obtain information regarding
farmers' understanding of probability and insurance beneﬁts prior to
the treatment. For those participants assigned to either of the game
Fig. 2. Overview of Interventions.
7 Our experimental set-up would in expectation yield that 89% of participants in the
game 20% group and 65% of the participants in the game 10% group are expected to
experience at least one disaster across the 10 rounds of the game. The results indicate
that 82% of households in the game 20% group and 66% of households in the game 10%
group experience at least one disaster.
8 As the game treatment takes longer than the calculation and control groups, we add
some non-experiment-related survey questions for the latter two groups to control for
any time eﬀect.
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groups, we obtain this information after they play the insurance game,
while for the other groups, we obtain this information before the
intervention. Speciﬁcally, to test their understanding of insurance
beneﬁts, we ask the following question: “Suppose your gross income
is 1000 RMB per mu, the loss from disaster is 400 RMB, insurance
premium is 3.6 RMB, you get 80 RMB from insurance company if there
is a disaster and you buy the insurance. What is your income per mu if
there is a disaster but you did not buy insurance? What is your income
per mu if there is a disaster and you bought the insurance?”
Table 1 reports the summary statistics and randomization check.
We conduct our experiment in three waves. In the ﬁrst wave, we
included control and 20% probability game group. In the second wave,
we further add the calculation group. In the third wave, we have eight
groups in total, adding both the 10% probability game group and the
probability treatment. Since we balance our randomization in each
wave, the statistics in Fig. 2 show a larger sample in the control and the
20% game group but a smaller sample in the calculation group, the 10%
game group, and the probability group.
4. Empirical results
In this section, we discuss the main empirical results. We ﬁrstly
look at the impact of playing insurance games on real insurance take-
up and explain the mechanisms of the eﬀect. We then explain the eﬀect
of the probability treatment on insurance purchase. Lastly, we discuss
the interaction eﬀect of the game and probability treatment on
insurance adoption.
4.1. The impact of game treatment on actual insurance take-up
As shown in Fig. 3, the insurance take-up rate for the control group
is 19.8%, while that of the calculation group is 24.7%. By contrast, the
take-up rate for the game group is 32.3%. To see whether these eﬀects
are statistically signiﬁcant, we run the following logit regression:
buy α α β Tg β Tc ϕX= + + + + + ϵij j k g ij c ij ij ij (1)
where buyij is an indicator that takes a value of one if household i in
natural village j buys the insurance, Tgij is an indicator for the game
treatment and Tcij is an indicator for the calculation treatment. Xij
represent household head characteristics (e.g., gender, age, years of
education, household size, area of production, car ownership, etc), and
αj and αk represent village ﬁxed eﬀects and experimenter ﬁxed eﬀects,
respectively. Since our roll-out design has three waves with diﬀerent set
of villages, including village ﬁxed eﬀects in the regression explicitly
controls for wave ﬁxed eﬀects.
We report the marginal eﬀects of our main interventions in Table 2.
The results in column (1) show that the marginal eﬀect of the game
treatment (0.091) is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level, while the
marginal eﬀect of the calculation treatment (0.024) is insigniﬁcantly
positive. This means that participating in the insurance game increases
insurance take-up by 9.1 percentage points, representing a 46%
increase relative to the baseline take-up rate of 20%.9 In column (2),
Table 1
Summary statistics and randomization check.
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3
Control Game 20% p-value Control Calculation Game 20% p-value Control Calculation Game 20% Game 10% p-value
Panel A: Before playing the game
Age 46.90 50.44 0.05 51.43 50.86 52.99 0.34 50.64 48.27 52.10 48.53 0.23
(11.33) (12.37) (11.41) (11.67) (12.32) (12.28) (11.47) (12.24) (12.17)
Education 1.38 1.32 0.57 1.30 1.30 1.35 0.84 1.45 1.37 1.41 1.44 0.94
(0.75) (0.82) (0.78) (0.71) (0.82) (0.78) (0.85) (0.93) (0.90)
Household size 4.80 5.04 0.62 5.05 5.25 5.26 0.80 4.48 4.60 4.31 4.58 0.75
(1.79) (2.30) (2.52) (2.84) (2.89) (1.29) (1.39) (1.69) (1.51)
Area of rice production (mu) 12.14 12.08 0.97 8.90 9.20 8.90 0.94 10.28 11.91 10.46 11.25 0.69
(9.58) (7.56) (7.51) (7.90) (7.79) (5.42) (13.57) (10.25) (7.37)
Share of rice income in total income
(%)
84.00 85.05 0.76 64.30 63.13 60.24 0.50 90.8 89.45 87.34 87.38 0.52
(21.16) (24.19) (28.2) (27.07) (28.04) (14.79) (15.58) (18.70) (16.99)
Loss in last year (%) (self-report) 6.72 6.98 0.92 24.29 22.96 23.01 0.79 31.60 29.38 26.94 29.37 0.53
(15.14) (16.91) (15.41) (15.12) (15.33) (18.02) (15.30) (13.65) (17.51)
Self-claim positive trust indicator 0.22 0.18 0.16 0.44 0.56 0.44 0.47 0.37 0.12
(0.42) (0.39) (0.37) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.48)
Other-claim positive trust indicator 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.90 0.26 0.26 0.35 0.21 0.35
(0.46) (0.45) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.48) (0.41)
Panel B: after playing the game
Risk aversion 4.13 4.16 4.10 0.95 3.20 3.23 3.04 3.11 0.90
(1.45) (1.44) (1.43) (1.52) (1.44) (1.59) (1.71)
Perceived probability of future
disaster (%)
23.10 22.33 21.64 0.76 24.10 23.15 21.38 23.80 0.30
(15.77) (15.52) (14.53) (9.83) (9.26) (9.26) (9.38)
Take-up ([0,1]) 0.19 0.24 0.42 0.17 0.17 0.32 0.01 0.28 0.39 0.37 0.36 0.61
(0.39) (0.43) (0.38) (0.38) (0.47) (0.45) (0.49) (0.49) (0.48)
Observations 86 95 121 124 134 52 73 49 151
Notes: This table presents the summary statistics on key variables and randomization check. In the control group, the enumerators give the household a ﬂyer with information about the
rice insurance program and explain the insurance contract brieﬂy. In the calculation group, we demonstrate how to calculate the expected payoﬀ of buying/not buying insurance if zero,
one, two or three disasters were to occur at any time in the following ten years. In the game 20% (respectively, 10%) group, we play a hypothetical insurance game for 10 rounds where
there are two (respectively, one) disasters. Education is coded as follows: 0-illiteracy; 1-primary school; 2-secondary school; 3-high school; 4-college. Self-claim trust indicator is deﬁned
as a dummy variable which equals one if a household has received a payout from another insurance contract and zero otherwise; other-claim positive trust indicator is measured by
whether a household observed other villagers receiving payouts from other insurance policies. Standard deviations are in the parentheses. P-value in wave 1 is for the F test of equal
means of two groups; P-value in wave 2 and 3 are for Wald test of equal means of three and four groups, respectively. *** signiﬁcant at 1% level, **signiﬁcant at 5% level, *signiﬁcant at
10% level.
9 Since there is a period of one to three days between the intervention and the
decision-making, there might be spillover eﬀects the insurance take-up rate. Thus, our
estimated treatment eﬀects are likely to reﬂect a lower bound relative to true treatment
eﬀects.
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we present the results of the game treatment separately for the 10 and
20% groups. These results show that the eﬀect of the game treatment
on insurance take-up is higher, albeit insigniﬁcantly, for the 20% game
group compared to the 10% game group. We discuss these ﬁndings in
greater detail in Section 4.2.3.
To further explain the magnitude of the game eﬀect, we compare
our results with the impact of real experiences of disasters on insurance
take-up. The results in column (3) of Table 2 show that the game eﬀect
on insurance take-up is equivalent to the eﬀect of a 42 percentage point
increase in actual yield loss in the previous year. Column (4) presents
the results when we add household characteristics to the estimation;
these results are similar.
We next test the heterogeneity of the game treatment eﬀect. Results
presented in Table 3 show that the magnitude of the game eﬀect does
not change with participant age, education, household size, production
scale, or the perceived probability of disasters.
4.2. Mechanisms driving the game eﬀect on insurance take-up
In this study, we consider three possible mechanisms that may
drive the observed game intervention eﬀect: (1) changes in risk
attitudes or the perceived probability of future disasters, (2) improved
knowledge about the beneﬁts of insurance, and (3) changes in
hypothetical experience with disasters. In this section, we consider
each mechanism in turn.
4.2.1. Changes in risk attitudes and the perceived probability of
future disaster10
First, to test the possibility that the game increases insurance
adoption because it changes participants' attitudes toward risk, we ask
whether the game treatment can change people's risk attitudes to the
extent that it can generate an impact on insurance take-up that is as
large as the game eﬀect. To do so, we estimate the following regression
system:
buy α α β risk β prob ϕX δ= + + + + +ij j k risk ij prob ij ij ij (2)
risk α α γ Tg γ Tc ϕX η= + + + + +ij j k gr ij cr ij ij ij (3)
risk α α β disaster ϕX ω= + + + +ij j k dr ij ij ij (4)
where riskij is a measure of risk aversion and disasterij is the number
of hypothetical disasters that a participant experiences during the
game. Eq. (2) represents the correlation between insurance take-up
and risk attitudes. We restrict the sample in Eq. (2) to the control and
calculation groups, as these are the groups that receive a pre-interven-
tion survey on their risk attitudes. In Eqs. (3) and (4), we estimate the
eﬀects of the insurance game and disaster experiences in the game,
respectively. We apply a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model
to estimate Eqs. (2)–(4). This allows us to account for any correlation
of error terms between equations.
We present the results in Table 4. The results in column (1) indicate
signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcients for both risk aversion (0.035) and the
perceived probability of future disasters (0.215). Column (2) presents
estimates for equation (3), including various controls and dummies for
missing values, while column (3) presents the results when we restrict
our sample to only the set of participants in the game treatment groups.
We then test the following two hypotheses:
β γ β=risk gr g (5)
β γ β1.48 =risk gr g (6)
Table 2
The effect of game treatment on insurance take-up.
Speciﬁcation: Logistic regression
Dep. Var.: Individual adoption of insurance
Sample: All sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Game (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.091 0.096 0.092
(0.039)** (0.037)*** (0.038)**
Calculation (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.024 0.019 0.028 0.030
(0.044) (0.045) (0.043) (0.041)
Game 20% (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.107
(0.035)***
Game 10% (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.047
(0.067)
Probability (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.043 0.039 0.050 0.046
(0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.049)








Area of rice production (mu) 0.0015
(0.0138)
Wald test: βg βc= β β=20 10 βg βc= βg βc=
p-value 0.1333 0.2911 0.1262 0.1474
Obs. 816 816 816 816
Omitted treatment Control
Mean of Dep. Var. for omitted
treatment:
0.198
Fixed eﬀects for village and
enumerator
Y Y Y Y
Log likelihood −430.63 −429.97 −428.34 −423.56
Pseudo R-square 0.0927 0.0941 0.0975 0.1076
Notes: This table tests the eﬀect of the game and calculation treatments on real insurance
take-up using all study sample. In the calculation treatment, we demonstrate how to
calculate the expected payoﬀ of buying/not buying insurance if zero, one, two or three
disasters were to occur at any time in the following ten years. In the game 20%
(respectively, 10%) treatment, we play a hypothetical insurance game for 10 rounds
where there are two (respectively, one) disasters. In the probability treatment, house-
holds were informed of the actual probability of disaster. Column (2) compares take-up
between the two game groups with 20% and 10% probability of disasters. In column (3),
the self reported percentage of loss in last year is included in the regression. In column
(4), additional control variables are added, including age and education of household
head, household size, and area of rice production. Standard errors are clustered by 16
natural villages. Robust clustered standard errors are in the parentheses.*** signiﬁcant at












Fig. 3. The eﬀect of game and calculation treatments on insurance take-up.Notes: This
ﬁgure shows the treatment eﬀect for the calculation group and the game group,
respectively. In the control group, the take-up rate is 19.8%. In the calculation group,
the take-up rate increases to 24.7%. In the game group, the take-up rate increases to
32.3%. These results suggest that both the game treatment and the calculation treatment
increase the actual take-up and the game treatment is more eﬀective.
10 1.48 is average number of hypothetical disasters people experienced during the
games.
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Table 3
The heterogeneity of the game effect on insurance take-up.
Speciﬁcation: Logistic regression
Dep. Var.: Individual adoption of insurance
Sample All sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Game (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.141 0.0279 0.108 0.195 0.0765 0.068
(0.0703)** −0.0465 (0.0644)* (0.0920)** −0.0543 (0.0312)**
Calculation (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.0275 0.0264 0.027 0.0277 0.0292 0.0318







Game×area of rice production (mu) −0.0292
(0.0211)
Game×%Loss Last Year 0.0589
(0.15)
Game× 0.0122
Perceived probability of future disaster (0.0107)
Obs. 816 816 816 816 816 816
Omitted treatment Control
Mean of Dep. Var. for omitted treatment: 0.198
Social-economic variables Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fixed eﬀects for village and enumerator Y Y Y Y Y Y
Log likelihood −425.63 −425.31 −425.93 −424.76 −425.84 −425.73
Pseudo R-square 0.1032 0.1039 0.1026 0.1050 0.1028 0.1030
Notes: This table tests the heterogeneity of the game treatment eﬀect on real insurance take-up using the whole study sample. The treatment indicators are interacted with the following
variables: age and education of household head, household size, and area of rice production, the percentage of yield loss last year, and the perceived probability of future disasters.
Standard errors are clustered by 16 natural villages. Robust clustered standard errors are in the bracket; *** signiﬁcant on 1% level, ** signiﬁcant on 5% level, * signiﬁcant on 10% level.
Table 4
The decomposition of the game effect: changes in risk aversion and perceived probability of future disasters.
Speciﬁcation: OLS regression
Dep. Var.: Individual adoption of
insurance
Risk aversion Perceived probability of future disaster
Sample: Control and Calculation All sample Game All sample Game
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Game (1=Yes, 0=No) −0.0237 −0.0152
(0.182) (0.00755)*




Perceived probability of future disaster 0.215
(0.110)*
Number of hypothetical disasters 0.0799 0.00297
(0.138) (0.00759)




Number of game rounds with no insurance purchase and draw a
disaster
−0.0493 0.0232




Obs. 329 697 320 320 667 310 310
Omitted treatment Control
Mean of dep. var. for omitted treatment: 0.198
Social-economic Variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fixed eﬀects for village and enumerator Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-square 0.1397 0.1932 0.2022 0.2068 0.0990 0.1896 0.2140
Notes: This table tests changes in risk aversion and perceived probability of future disasters as mechanisms of the game intervention. In column (1), we restrict the sample to the control
group and the calculation group and tests the impact of risk aversion and perceived probability of future disasters on insurance take-up. In columns (2)–(4), we regress risk aversion
indicator on treatment indicators and controls. In columns (5)–(7), we regress the perceived probability of future disasters on treatment indicators and controls. Standard errors are
clustered by 16 natural villages. Robust clustered standard errors are in the parentheses. *** signiﬁcant on 1% level, ** signiﬁcant on 5% level, * signiﬁcant on 10% level.
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The ﬁrst hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level (p=0.024), with a
95% conﬁdence interval in [−0.012, 0.010], while the second hypoth-
esis is also rejected at the 5% level (p=0.028), with a 95% conﬁdence
interval of 1.48βriskγgr ranging in [−0.003, 0.004]. Overall, these
results suggest that changes in risk attitudes are unlikely to explain the
game eﬀect.11
We next use a similar strategy to examine whether an increased
perceived probability of future disasters drives our main eﬀect. The
results in Table 4, column (5) indicate that the game treatment has an
overall negative eﬀect on the perceived probability of future disasters.
We further see that the coeﬃcient for the number of hypothetical
disasters is not signiﬁcant (column (6)). As a result, we conclude that
changes in the perceived probability of future disasters are unlikely to
explain the game treatment eﬀect.
Examining the ﬁnding that the game treatment actually reduces
the perceived probability of future disasters, we look more closely at
the experiences our participants have during the game. Speciﬁcally,
we examine the following four types of experiences: not buy
insurance and draw a disaster, not buy insurance and experience
no disaster, buy insurance and draw a disaster, buy insurance and
experience no disaster. Examining these groups, we ﬁnd that the
marginally signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of the game treatment on
perceived probability is mainly driven by participants who have
more rounds of not buying insurance and experiencing no disasters
(column (7), Table 4). This group likely anchors on the low
probability of disasters experienced during the game in determining
their perceived probability of disaster.
4.2.2. Changes in knowledge regarding the beneﬁts of insurance
We next consider whether the game eﬀect is driven by improve-
ments in knowledge about the beneﬁts of insurance. We use three
strategies to test this channel.
First, we compare the eﬀects of the game and calculation treat-
ments. If learning about insurance beneﬁts is the main driver behind
the game eﬀect, then we should see no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in
insurance take-up between the game and calculation treatments, as
each provides the same information about insurance beneﬁts. Here, we
ﬁnd that the calculation treatment eﬀect is statistically insigniﬁcant,
resulting in an increased take-up of 2.4 percentage points.
Second, we include post-treatment survey questions to test whether
the game treatment improves knowledge of insurance beneﬁts. The
results in columns (1) and (4) in Table 5 show that the coeﬃcients for
the game treatment are small and insigniﬁcant. However, it is still
possible that the subset of farmers who experience more disasters
during the game might learn more about the insurance beneﬁts.
Consequently, we test whether the number of hypothetical disasters
has an impact on insurance knowledge. The results in columns (2) and
(5) show that the coeﬃcient for the Number of Hypothetical Disasters
is slightly negative and insigniﬁcant.12
Finally, we examine whether insurance knowledge obtained during
the game is diﬀerent for groups with diﬀerent hypothetical experiences.
Using the four types of experience outlined in Section 4.2.1, we
consider whether participants learn more about insurance beneﬁts if
they do not buy insurance in the game yet draw a disaster. It is possible
that this negative experience may draw more attention to the income
and insurance beneﬁts calculation. Our results in columns (3) and (6)
of Table 5 show that the level of insurance knowledge does not vary
with the number of negative outcomes experienced during the game.
Table 5
The effect of game treatment on insurance knowledge.
Speciﬁcation: OLS regression
Sample All sample
Dep. Var.: Insurance Benefit Question 1 Insurance Benefit Question 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Game (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.00879 0.031 0.0163 0.0158 0.0248 0.0126
(0.00975) (0.0241) (0.0140) (0.0219) (0.0232) (0.0214)
%Loss Last Year (self report) −0.102 0.0385
Number of hypothetical disasters −0.0176 −0.0092
(0.0177) (0.00841)
Number of game rounds with insurance purchase and draw a disaster −0.0084 −0.0001
(0.0056) (0.0029)
Number of game rounds with no insurance purchase and draw a disaster −0.0315 −0.0446
(0.0296) (0.0526)
Number of game rounds with no insurance and no disaster 0.0071 0.0082
(0.0076) (0.0074)
Obs. 658 650 650 657 649 649
Omitted treatment Control
Mean of dep. var. for omitted treatment: 0.416 0.265
Social-economic variables Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fixed eﬀects for village and enumerator Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-square 0.7692 0.7589 0.7594 0.6882 0.6757 0.6765
Notes: This table tests the eﬀect of the game treatment on insurance knowledge test result based on the whole study sample. Insurance Beneﬁt Question 1 is “Suppose your gross income
is 1000 RMB per mu, the loss from disaster is 400 RMB, insurance premium is 3.6 RMB, you get 80 RMB from insurance company if there is a disaster and you buy the insurance. What
is your income per mu if there is a disaster but you did not buy insurance? ” Insurance Beneﬁt Question 2 is “What is your income per mu if there is a disaster and you bought the
insurance?” In columns (3) and (6), we test the impact of four types of game experience on insurance knowledge: buy insurance and draw a disaster, buy insurance and experience no
disaster (omitted), not buy insurance and draw a disaster, and not buy insurance and experience no disaster. Standard errors are clustered by 16 natural villages. Robust clustered
standard errors are in the bracket; *** signiﬁcant on 1% level, ** signiﬁcant on 5% level, * signiﬁcant on 10% level.
11 Note that we do not assume a lack of measurement error. Rather, we assume that
there is no diﬀerential measurement error between the control and the treatment groups.
Since subjects are randomly assigned to diﬀerent groups, any measurement error is likely
to be the same across diﬀerent treatment groups.
12 We consider the level of complexity for our questions that test insurance knowledge.
First, our control group is able to provide 41.6% correct answers for insurance question 1
and 26.5% correct answers for insurance question 2 (Table 5). Furthermore, we test the
interaction eﬀect between our game treatment and the level of participant education. If
our questions are complex, those with a higher education level should demonstrate a
bigger eﬀect of the game treatment on insurance knowledge. However, our results in
columns (1) and (2) of Table A3 show that the coeﬃcient for the interaction between
game treatment and education is negative and insigniﬁcant. As a result, we conclude that
our questions are not too complicated for farmers to answer.
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Thus, we conclude that an increase in knowledge of insurance beneﬁts
does not drive our main result.13
4.2.3. Changes in hypothetical experience
The ﬁnal explanation that we consider is that the hypothetical
experience gained during the game is the driver behind the eﬀect of the
game on insurance adoption. To test this hypothesis, we take advantage
of the exogenous variation of the number of hypothetical disasters
during the game and test the eﬀect of that on real insurance purchase
decisions. We present the results in column (1) of Table 6. The
coeﬃcient (0.059) is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 10%
level.
Again, we use our four groups of game experiences to analyze the
relationship between the number of rounds with each type of experi-
ence and real insurance take-up rates. The results in column (2) of
Table 6 show that experiencing one more round of not buying
insurance and drawing a disaster increases real insurance take-up by
5.4 percentage points, while experiencing one more round of not
buying insurance and not drawing a disaster reduces real insurance
take-up by 1.6 percentage points. These results suggest that one
possible explanation of the eﬀect of hypothetical disaster experience
on insurance take-up is that, simulated experiences during the game
improve the salience of disasters to farmers and, as a result, increase
their insurance take-up.
We next explore the eﬀect of disaster experience on insurance take-
up when participants experience a disaster in the ﬁrst ﬁve vs. last ﬁve
rounds of the game. Fig. 4 outlines the insurance take-up rate across
diﬀerent treatment groups.
We analyze the relation between disaster timing and insurance
take-up using the following regression:
buy α α γ Tg γ Tc β disasterfirst β disasterlast
δ
= + + + + 5 + 5
+




As seen in column (3) of Table 6, the coeﬃcient for “disaster experience
in the ﬁrst half of the game” is negative and insigniﬁcant. By contrast,
the coeﬃcient for ”disaster experience in the last half of the game” is
positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level. This latter coeﬃcient suggests
that experiencing an additional disaster in the last half of the game
increases insurance take-up by 7.0% points.14 Furthermore, if we
regress insurance take-up on the number of hypothetical disasters in
the ﬁrst (10−n) rounds and that in the last n rounds, we ﬁnd that, when
n equals 5–9, the coeﬃcients for the last n rounds are all positive and
signiﬁcant at the 5% level (Table A4).15
Overall, our results regarding the timing of when participants
experience a disaster in the game are consistent with the “recency
eﬀect” deﬁned in the existing literature (Fredrickson and Kahneman,
1993; Schreiber and Kahneman, 2000; Erev and Haruvy, 2013). This
literature has demonstrated that the experience during the ﬁnal
moments of a lab experiment impacts subsequent evaluations, and
participants assign greater weight to the latter moments in an experi-
ment. Although the length of these experiments is generally short,
recent research provides consistent evidence that the latter moments
also impact long-term individual behavior. For example, Haisley and
Loewenstein (2011) ﬁnd that, given the same total gift value, those who
Table 6
The effect of the number of hypothetical disasters on real insurance take-up.
Speciﬁcation: Logistic regression
Dep. Var.: Individual adoption of insurance
Sample: All sample
(1) (2) (3)
Game (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.0102 0.0907 0.0468
(0.059) (0.0527)* (0.0458)
Calculation (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.0417 0.0454 0.0445
(0.0461) (0.0472) (0.0459)
Number of hypothetical disasters 0.0592
(0.0311)*
Number of game rounds with insurance
purchase and draw a disaster
0.0059
(0.0137)
Number of game rounds with no




Number of game rounds with no
insurance and no disaster
−0.0156
(0.0079)**
Number of hypothetical disasters in ﬁrst
half of game (2011–2015)
−0.0191
(0.0236)
Number of hypothetical disasters in
second half of game (2016–2020)
0.0698
(0.0333)**
Obs. 804 804 804
Mean of Dep. Var. for Omitted
Treatment:
0.198
Social-economic variables Y Y Y
Fixed eﬀects for village and enumerator Y Y Y
Log likelihood −426.81 −426.93 −425.6
Pseudo R-square 0.0858 0.0855 0.0884
Notes: This table tests the eﬀect of experiences of hypothetical disasters during the game
treatment on real insurance take-up based on the whole study sample. In column (2), we
test the impact of four types of game experience on insurance take-up: buy insurance and
draw a disaster, buy insurance and experience no disaster (omitted), not buy insurance
and draw a disaster, and not buy insurance and experience no disaster. Standard errors
are clustered by 16 natural villages. Robust clustered standard errors are in the
parentheses. *** signiﬁcant on 1% level; ** signiﬁcant on 5% level, * signiﬁcant on
10% level.
Fig. 4. Take-up by treatment groups.Notes: This ﬁgure shows the insurance take-up by
treatment groups. The left two bars show insurance take-up in the Control and the
Calculation treatment. The right two bars show insurance take-up conditional on the
number of disasters in the ﬁrst ﬁve rounds and last ﬁve rounds.
13 Another strategy we use to rule out the knowledge mechanism is to test whether the
game treatment increases the probability that subjects provide a concrete answer rather
than “I do not know” when answering the insurance questions. If people learn knowledge
from the game treatment, they should be more conﬁdent in answering the question.
However, the results in columns (3) and (4) in Table A3 show that there is no eﬀect of the
game treatment on the probability that subjects provide a concrete answer.
14 We also investigate the relation between disaster timing and hypothetical insurance
take-up decisions during the game. For details, refer to Appendix C.
15 The relation between real past disaster experience and actual insurance take-up
shows a similar pattern: a one percent increase in loss in the previous year increases
insurance take-up by 0.36% points; this result is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. By contrast, a
one percent increase in loss two years before increases insurance take-up by 0.19%
points; this result is not signiﬁcant (p=0.319). Finally, a one percent increase in loss
three years before reduces insurance take-up by 0.16% points; again, this result is not
signiﬁcant (p=0.412).
J. Cai, C. Song Journal of Development Economics 124 (2017) 83–94
91
receive a gift with a low value in the last round of an experiment have a
much lower deposit balance ﬁve months after the experiment than
those who receive a gift with a high value in the last round of the
experiment. Healy and Lenz (2014) show that voters respond primarily
to the election-year economy when making their choices; and Karlan
et al. (2014a, 2014b) documents that farmers are more likely to buy
weather-index insurance if they recently experienced disasters and
payouts.
Examining the recency eﬀect, we consider three possible explana-
tions. First, memory may decrease over time. However, the brief nature
of our games suggests that this is not a likely channel. Second, recent
experiences of hypothetical disasters make disasters more salient to
farmers.16 Lastly, the recency eﬀect can be driven by people's failure to
iterate (Camerer et al., 2004), so that they think only the ﬁnal rounds of
the game lead to the overall game outcomes. To test the above two
mechanisms, we look at the eﬀect of the number of hypothetical
disasters on post-game perceived probability of future disasters. If the
recency eﬀect is driven by a salience eﬀect or failure of iteration, we
should see a similar eﬀect on the perceived probability of disaster. The
results in Table 7, column (1) show that experiencing a disaster in the
last round increases the perceived probability of disaster by 3.9
percentage points, which is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Experiencing
an additional disaster in the last two rounds increases the perceived
probability of disaster by 2.3 percentage points, again signiﬁcant at the
5% level (Table 7, column (2)). By contrast, disaster experience in the
ﬁrst seven rounds has no eﬀect on participants' perceived probability of
disaster (Table 7 column (3)). Together, these results support the
explanation that the recency eﬀect is due to a salience eﬀect or the
failure of iteration.
In our setting, the subjects face two lotteries: one without purchas-
ing insurance, and the other with insurance purchase. The subjects
choose between the two lotteries based on decision weights in favor of
the salient payoﬀ. The experience about hypothetical disasters, espe-
cially the recent disasters, can make the state with disaster more salient
(more available) to the subjects. As a result, the local thinker evaluates
the lottery by inﬂating the relative weights attached to the state with
disaster. Hence, we observed that recent hypothetical disasters during
the game increased the insurance take-up.
4.3. The impact of probability treatment on insurance take-up
The second main intervention we implement to improve insurance
take-up is the probability treatment, in which the true probability of
natural disasters is explicitly revealed to farmers. According to Fig. 5,
farmers in the probability treatment group have a higher average take-
up than those in the no-probability group.
To test whether this eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant, we run the
following regression:
buy α α δ Probability ϕX= + + + + ϵij j k p ij ij ij (8)
where Probabilityij is an indicator that takes a value of one if house-
hold i in natural village j is in the probability treatment group and zero
otherwise.
We present the results of this regression in Table 8. According to
the results in columns (1) and (2), the probability treatment increases
insurance take-up signiﬁcantly: farmers who receive the probability
treatment are almost 30 percentage points more likely to buy the
insurance. Thus, providing knowledge about the probability of disas-
ters can help farmers understand the value of the insurance product,
and as a consequence improves insurance take-up rates.
4.4. The interaction eﬀect of the game/calculation and the probability
treatment
The game/calculation treatment eﬀects can be diﬀerent depending
on whether farmers were provided with information about the actual
probability of disasters. To test the interaction eﬀect between the game
and the probability treatment, we run the following estimation:
Table 7
The effect of the number of hypothetical disasters on perceived probability of future
disasters.
Speciﬁcation: OLS regression
Dep. Var.: Perceived probability of future disasters
Sample: Game
(1) (2) (3)
Number of hypothetical disasters in
ﬁrst half of game (2011–2019)
−0.0010
(0.0064)
Disaster in last year 2020 0.0387
(0.0167)**
Number of hypothetical disasters in
ﬁrst Eight Years (2011–2018)
−0.0019
(0.0078)
Number of hypothetical disasters in
last Two Years (2019–2020)
0.0230
(0.0096)**
Number of hypothetical disasters in
ﬁrst Seven Years (2011–2017)
−0.0020
(0.0088)
Number of hypothetical disasters in
last Three Years (2018–2020)
0.0164
(0.0082)*
Obs. 310 310 310
Social-economic variables Y Y Y
Fixed eﬀects for village and
enumerator
Y Y Y
Pseudo R-square 0.2008 0.1989 0.1965
Notes: This table tests the impact of the number of hypothetical disasters in early vs. later
rounds of the game on the perceived probability of fugure disasters, using the game
treatment group. Standard errors are clustered by 16 natural villages. Robust clustered
standard errors are in the parentheses. *** signiﬁcant on 1% level, ** signiﬁcant on 5%
level, * signiﬁcant on 10% level.
Fig. 5. Treatment eﬀects by the probability treatment.Notes: This ﬁgure shows the
treatment eﬀect by the probability treatment. Without the probability treatment, the
game treatment is more eﬀective than the calculation treatment. With the probability
treatment, neither the game treatment nor the calculation treatment is as eﬀective.
16 According to Taylor and Thompson (1982), “Salience refers to the phenomenon
that when one's attention is diﬀerentially directed to one portion of the environment
rather than to others, the information contained in that portion will receive dispropor-
tionate weighting in subsequent judgments.” Recent literature applies salience theory to
explain consumer decisions (Koszegi and Szeidl, 2013; Bordalo et al., 2013a), choice
under risk (Bordalo et al., 2013b), and ﬁnancial behavior (Alan et al., 2016).
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buy α α β Tg γ Tc δ Probability η Tg Probability
η Tc Probability ϕX
= + + + + + *
+ * + + ϵ
ij j k g ij cr ij p ij ij ij
ij ij ij ij
1
2 (9)
The results of this estimation are shown in column (3) of Table 8.
Surprisingly, we ﬁnd that the game and the probability treatment
cancel each other out. In other words, both the game and the
calculation treatment eﬀects are much smaller when farmers are told
about the true probability of disasters, although the interaction is not
statistically signiﬁcant.
One explanation for this ﬁnding is that our participants may
dismiss the value of the insurance game if it provides disaster results
that contradict the real probability of disaster. To test this, we estimate
the heterogeneity of the probability treatment eﬀect depending on the
number of hypothetical disasters experienced during the game. We ﬁnd
that, conditional on zero hypothetical disasters during the game, the
probability treatment eﬀect is 0.015 and insigniﬁcant. However, the
eﬀect becomes −0.023, −0.058 and −0.114 respectively, conditional on
one, two or three hypothetical disasters during the game. These results
suggest that farmers may value the game less if it does not coincide
with the real disaster probability, and thus the game treatment
disappears when the true probability of disaster is provided.
However, we should note again that our small probability subsample
precludes us from estimating these eﬀects precisely.
4.5. Discussion
While our analyses have shown that hypothetical disaster experi-
ence can increase insurance take-up rates, we acknowledge that
weather insurance take-up rates in rural China remain quite low.
Even with the high government subsidy, the overall take-up rate is only
30%, while our calibration results in Appendix B suggest that a 70%
government subsidy should lead to a take-up rate of 60%. In this
section, we use our data to examine why the overall take-up rate is low.
Speciﬁcally, we consider the following explanations: lack of trust in the
government or the insurance company, perceptions of high transaction
costs, and the availability of non-insurance-based government relief.
To test the impact of trust on insurance take-up, we use two
methods. First, we test for the correlation between weather insurance
take-up and experience with purchasing other insurance products. Our
results in columns (1)–(3) in Table A5 show that those who have
purchased life or asset insurance are less likely to buy rice insurance.
The reason could be that these households have had a negative
experience with the purchase of insurance and thus have less trust in
insurance companies.17 Second, we construct several measures of trust,
including the self-reported level of trust in the insurance company as
well as the household's payout experience with other insurance
products, and relate these measures to insurance adoption decisions.
We report the results in columns (4)–(6) in Table A5. The results in
column (4) show that the self-reported level of trust in insurance
companies is positively correlated with insurance take-up. Column (5)
shows the results when we measure trust by a dummy variable equal to
one if a household has received a payout from another insurance
contract and zero otherwise. These results show that those who have
received payouts before are more likely to buy rice insurance. Finally,
the results in column (6) show no eﬀect of observing other villagers
receiving a payout from other insurance products on a given farmer's
insurance take-up. Together, these results suggest that a lack of trust
on the insurance company is another important factor inﬂuencing
insurance take-up. However, this should not aﬀect the results of our
experiment because the trust indicators are balanced between the
treatment and control groups as shown in Table 1, Panel A.
We also consider the possibility that the low insurance take-up is
due to the anticipation of high transaction costs or long delays in
receiving payouts. However, we dismiss these as possible explanations
in our setting as our insurance contract states that the payout will be
issued within ten days after a loss report. Moreover, starting in 2004,
the Chinese government began depositing annual rice production
subsidies in each farmer's bank account; any insurance payout would
thus be conveniently made through the same bank account.
Lastly, farmers may not feel they need insurance since the govern-
ment provides relief if major natural disasters occur. However,
according to our conversations with local farmers, these transfers are
usually far from suﬃcient to help them resume production - in most
cases the government only distribute small amount of money (less than
50 RMB per household) or some vegetables. Consequently, we con-
clude that the availability of government relief does not explain the low
insurance take-up rate.
In sum, the above results suggest that in our context, the lack of
trust on the insurance company can be another potential factor driving
the low take-up rate. As a result, making sure that payouts are
distributed fairly and on time is important in improving long-term
take-up rates.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we oﬀer new evidence on the impact of disaster
experience and knowledge on weather insurance take-up rates. First,
substituting real experience with hypothetical experience in a game
setting, we ﬁnd that playing an insurance game increases the real
insurance take-up rate by 9.1 percentage points, a 46% increase
relative to the baseline take-up rate of 20%. After investigating possible
mechanisms that could be driving this eﬀect, we ﬁnd that exposure to
hypothetical disasters is the main explanation for the observed eﬀect.
In a second intervention, we examine the impact of improving knowl-
edge about the expected beneﬁts of the insurance product by explicitly
revealing the true probability of disasters in the past ten years. We ﬁnd
Table 8
The effect of probability treatment on insurance take-up.
Speciﬁcation: Logistic regression
Dep. Var.: Individual adoption of insurance
Sample: Control All Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probability (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.294 0.298 0.184 0.183
(0.136)** (0.141)* (0.134) (0.138)
Game (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.120 0.119
(0.0395)*** (0.0416)**






Obs. 243 243 816 816
Mean of Dep. Var. for Omitted
Treatment:
0.198
Social-economic Variables N Y N Y
Fixed eﬀects for village and
enumerator
Y Y Y Y
R-square 0.1609 0.1900 0.1100 0.1268
Notes: This table tests the impact of the probaiblity treatment and its interaction eﬀect
with the game treatment on real insurance take-up. In the Probability treatment,
households were informed of the actual probability of disaster. Dependent variable is
individual adoption. Columns (1)–(2) tests the probability treatment eﬀect; columns (3)–
(4) shows the interaction eﬀect of the game and the probaiblity treatment. Standard
errors are clustered by 16 natural villages. Robust clustered standard errors are in the
parentheses. *** signiﬁcant on 1% level, ** signiﬁcant on 5% level, * signiﬁcant on 10%
level.
17 These two types of insurance were oﬀered to all households in the early 2000s; in
some cases, the insurance company did not repay after losses were reported.
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that this treatment also has a strong eﬀect on real insurance take-up
rates. Interestingly, participating in the game coupled with receiving
information about the true probability of disasters reduces the game
eﬀect, albeit not signiﬁcantly.
Our results suggest that, ﬁrst, the large impact of the game
treatment on real insurance take-up and the insigniﬁcant eﬀect of the
calculation treatment suggest that, giving households a rule of thumb
to follow through simulated experiences could be more eﬀective in
improving their decision-making compared with oﬀering theoretical
training. Similar interventions can be used on a broader level to
inﬂuence the adoption of other ﬁnancial products that involve un-
certainty and require some time to experience the gain or loss. Second,
our results show that informing farmers about the real probability of
disasters can help them estimate the product value and thus lead them
to make better-informed purchase decisions. Many other ﬁnancial
decisions also involve complexities that individuals have diﬃculty
understanding based on their own information. In many cases,
ﬁnancial education is provided to help people make decisions. Our
ﬁndings suggest that providing information on the true expected values
of ﬁnancial assets could be important in improving the eﬀectiveness of
ﬁnancial education.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in the
online version at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2016.08.007.
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